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At least until recently, accepted wisdom has held that sprawl is recent, particularly
American and that it has been caused by a rapid growth in automobile ownership and
use. It is also widely believed that for economic, social, environmental and aesthetic
reasons sprawl is bad and should be stopped. A good way of doing this, many observers
believe, is to promote “Smart Growth.” Higher density and more compact urban pat-
terns, proponents believe, would lead to less “automobile dependence,” more walking
and transit use and, as a result, better access to jobs and other activities and a better
environment.¹
1 Misreading history
ere are several problems with this formula. e ﬁrst is that the diagnosis relies on an
erroneous reading of history. Sprawl is neither recent nor particularly American, and
it was in full force long before the advent of the private automobile. If sprawl is the
outward movement of people at lower densities without any over-arching planning or
control, then sprawl is as old as cities. e reasons for this are not hard to ﬁnd. Living
at the center of most cities from the earliest times until very recently meant congestion,
pollution and highly unsanitary living conditions for most of the urban population.
Whenever a new group of people had suﬃcient resources, many families were likely to
try to escape the city, either by moving to the suburbs or getting a weekend or country
house in the exurban belt beyond the suburban edge. is pattern was already fully
visible in ancient Rome where those fortunate enough to have private transportation,
meaning horses and carriages, were able to spend at least part of their time at the sea
or in the cool hills east of the city.
In the modern world, the outward sprawl of London from the beginning of the
industrial revolution until about 1950 was certainly as great as anything seen since
World War II in the United States. is is not surprising since London was the largest
and most aﬄuent city in the Western world. With densities of over 100,000 people
abbrueg@uic.edu
¹ Many of the ideas in this essay are adapted from my book Sprawl: A Compact History (2005). For
a classic statement on how cities should be remade to make it easier to provide transit see Newman and
Kenworthy (1999)
Copyright 2008 Robert Bruegmann.
Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial License 3.0.
6 J  T  L U :
at the center, it was not just unpleasant. It was deadly. e rudimentary sanitation
systems in the poorest quarters provided little protection against infection. Plagues
swept through city centers at regular intervals killing oﬀ vast numbers of people. For
this reason it is not surprising that as soon as they were able, families moved outward.
In the eighteenth century, for example, thousands of families departed the old me-
dieval city of London. Many of the less aﬄuent moved east toward the burgeoning
industrial areas by the docks in eastern London. ey only moved a short distance
because their only means of getting around was walking, and they were obliged to live
near their place of work. e more aﬄuent Londoners tended to move west into the
newly developed squares and terraces of what was then the suburban edge of London
but is now the central West End. ese neighborhoods were much lower in density,
quieter and more hygienic than those at the center of London. For many heads of
household this meant a long-distance commute to jobs back in the center of London.
is was only possible because of the eﬃciency of privately owned horse-drawn car-
riages. e same was true of those moving even further from the city center, to what
were then remote agricultural towns in the countryside around London.
Virtually the entire history of modern cities is the history of newer and more eﬃ-
cient modes of transportation and the spreading outward of urban activity at ever lower
densities. Every period of economic growth allowed a new group of people to move
out. By the nineteenth century this had become a mass movement as even middle-
class families could aﬀord to do live at some distance from the center. In response
there appeared a rapid succession of new means of urban transportation.
e advent of the railroad and public transportation made it possible to vastly
increase the outward migration. In the London area miles of sturdy brick row houses
were built all around the suburban periphery from Camberwell and Clapham on the
south to Islington and St. John’s Woods in the north. For many of the families moving
into these houses they were small miracles. Even the most modest row house gave them
some measure of the kind of privacy, mobility and choice that were once only available
to the wealthiest and most powerful urban dwellers. To an intellectual and artistic
elite of the day, however, these new developments were cheap, ugly boxes put up by
greedy developers that defaced the beautiful British countryside. Nor did this elite
necessarily regard the mobility provided by public transit and the railroad as a blessing.
e railroads “only encourage the common people to move about needlessly” opined
the Duke of Wellington.
It is certainly true that the automobile was a major force in allowing sprawl to
continue in the form it did in the twentieth century just as the railroad had been a
powerful force in the nineteenth. But the experience of London over the previous
centuries demonstrates that sprawl didn’t require the automobile. Even Los Angeles,
widely considered to be the automobile city par excellence, became the world’s most
dispersed large city already by 1900well before the full impact of the automobile started
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to be felt. It was the railroad and the street car that allowed this to happen. And
contrary to what many people assume, Los Angeles has been getting denser rather than
less dense for at least the past half century during an era when most people have used
the automobile as their primary means of getting around. e Los Angeles urbanized
area (the Census Bureau’s functional deﬁnition of “urban” that includes a central city
and all of the surrounding land above 1,000 people per square mile) has increased in
density from barely over 4,000 people per mile to over 7,000 people per square mile,
making it the densest urban area in the United States. It is this increasing density,
not sprawl, together with the fact that Los Angeles has one of the lowest provisions of
freeway miles per capita in the nation, that has led to increasing traﬃc congestion in
Los Angeles. is has happened despite the fact that Los Angeles has one of the most
extensive transit systems and lowest car ownership rates in the country today.
One of the things that all of these erroneous preconceptions about sprawl demon-
strate is the complexity of urban systems and the way that in these complex systems
almost every cause is also an eﬀect and vice versa. us, rather than say, as many peo-
ple do, that the automobile was a principal cause of sprawl in the twentieth century, it
would probably be at least as accurate to say that a desire for lower density living was
the reason automobile makers were able to transform themselves from a small indus-
try turning out luxury products to an enormous industry making a product that has
become a standard ﬁxture in aﬄuent households worldwide.
It also suggests that all transportation means are profoundly ambiguous in their
impact on the built environment. e railroad, surely a key factor in creating the dense
industrial city of the nineteenth century, was also a key factor in its decentralization.
Likewise the automobile, which clearly has aided in the dispersal of cities, can also play
a role in making them denser.
Curiously, as Los Angeles has become more dense over the last 50 years, the large,
old cities of the American East and Europe have continued to become less dense. No
large European urban area now counts even 15,000 people per square mile and many,
particularly highly aﬄuent northern European urban areas like Hamburg or Copen-
hagen, are now less dense than Los Angeles. With this decline in density has come
a spectacular rise in automobile ownership and use. Despite draconian governmental
policies to inhibit automobile use and the expenditure of billions of dollars on public
transportation, transit ridership in Europe has remained largely ﬂat since World War
II while automobile ownership and use have soared. Although many people like to
observe that Europeans still drive less than Americans, in fact the upward trajectory of
automobile ownership and automobile use have increased in Europe in almost exactly
the same way as in the United States, simply with a time lag due to a lag in aﬄuence.
So, the pattern of American car ownership as it started to take oﬀ in the 1920s is al-
most identical to that of Europe since the 1960s. And, as the American market reaches
saturation, European car ownership and use are now rising quite a bit faster than in
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the United States.
One of the most important reasons for the dramatic rise in automobile use every-
where has been the way it has vastly increased mobility for most people. Because the
automobile, like the private horse-drawn carriage before it, allows individuals to travel
directly from point A to point B whenever the owner wishes, travel times using the
automobile are almost always much shorter than travel times using public transporta-
tion. is explains, for example, why average commuting times are so much longer in
dense, urban areas with heavy transit use, for example Tokyo with over 11,000 people
per square mile in its urbanized area, than they are in less dense regions, for example
Los Angeles. is is true as we have already remarked, even though the road network
in the Los Angeles area has not been expanded to keep up with population growth
or the increase in density. Likewise in the Paris region, where commuting times by
individuals who use the automobile are on average about 27 minutes, for those using
public transportation the ﬁgure is 53 minutes. Is it any wonder that as urban dwellers
become more aﬄuent and value their time more highly they almost invariably shun
slower and less comfortable means of transportation for faster, more comfortable ones?
is shift in transportation mode might also provide a hypothesis for why densities
appear to be converging across the world. As Los Angeles and virtually all of the low-
density but fast-growing regions of the American West increase in density while the
higher-density older urban areas in the American East and Europe decline in density,
they appear to be converging in a band between 5,000 and 15,000 people per square
mile. It is possible that this represents a new early twenty-ﬁrst century urban norm in
which densities are high enough to support much traditional urban culture but still
allow for most of the inhabitants to own and use automobiles.
2 Policy implications
e almost universal decline in density and rise in automobile ownership within the
aﬄuent world over the last several centuries undermines many of the key elements of
“Smart Growth” orthodoxy.
Take, for example, the notion of “automobile dependency,” so forcefully described
by Peter Newman andGeoﬀrey Kenworthy in a series of books and articles². ey have
tried to argue that sprawl has led to higher energy costs, longer commutes and more
highway congestion. ese ideas have been strongly rebutted by Peter Gordon and
Harry Richardson, among others, who have pointed out that the only reason com-
muting times remained fairly stable through much of the twentieth century despite an
enormous increase of population in many American cities was precisely because these
² eir ﬁrst important work was Cities and Automobile Dependence: An International Sourcebook
(1989). More recently, they published Sustainability and Cities (1999).
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cities spread out. Because both jobs and housing decentralized, this allowed for the cre-
ation at the expanding periphery of road systems better than those that can be found
in the center of most older cities.(see, for example, Crane and Chatman 2003; Gordon
and Richardson 2001)
It is true that many people in the United States and Europe today are dependent
on their automobiles because there is no other viable means to meet all of their daily
transportation needs. is is not surprising given that it usually requires a fairly high
level of density, often estimated at 10,000 people per square mile, to support a sub-
stantial transportation system, and even then this system only works well where trip
origins and destinations are tightly clustered, for example when one side of the trip is
a place with a very high density of jobs, for example a downtown or an airport. e
majority of urban territory in the aﬄuent western world falls well below the 10,000
threshold and increasingly the dominant position central cities held as a center of jobs
for an entire region is being eroded with the growth of regional sub-centers.
In this context the phrase “automobile dependency” can seem as silly as “refriger-
ator dependency.” It is possible for people to do without refrigerators but why would
anyone choose to do so? Likewise with automobiles. ere are obviously some people
who can’t or don’t wish to drive, and they need to be accommodated. But trying to
force the vast majority of citizens who would prefer driving to instead take buses and
trains in an eﬀort to assure adequate transit for those who don’t drive appears doomed
to failure. e needs of the ﬁrst group are often completely diﬀerent from the needs
of the second.
Of course, many advocates of Smart Growth believe that automobile travel is in-
herently bad for other, especially environmental reasons. ey argue that automobile
driving causes pollution and leads to climate change. However, automobiles have in-
creased in fuel eﬃciency and decreased their emissions to the point where the average
automobile uses barely more energy per passenger mile traveled and emits no more
greenhouse gases per passenger mile traveled than an average bus, and buses carry the
vast majority of transit passengers in the country today. Although this may sound re-
markable at ﬁrst glance, it is important to remember that buses tend to get very low
gasoline mileage and over 24 hours and 7 days a week the average number of people
in a bus is low. e real problem with both the automobile and the bus is the fuel
source. Solving this problem should be the focus of environmental policy, not trying
to substitute one means of transportation for another.
Even if less automobile use were inherently desirable, there is a good deal of ev-
idence to suggest that the new higher density, mixed use land patterns proposed by
Smart Growth proponents would not, by themselves, result in any substantial increase
in bus or rail use, reduction in automobile use or enhanced mobility. It appears that it
would take enormous increases in density or vastly improved transit speed and in relia-
bility to coax even half of new drivers out of their cars. If densities increased to the point
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where most people used public transportation, this would still involve a major increase
in the number of automobile drivers within a given area guaranteeing that congestion
would be much worse. And unless all of the public transit were grade-separated, the
transit itself would add greatly to this congestion.
3 Eyes on the future rather than the past
One of the worst aspects of the ﬁght against sprawl has been the way its enemies have
tended to focus their attention on reviving some imagined golden age of the past when
cities were denser, and supposedly more socially just, environmentally sound and ef-
ﬁcient. In fact this golden age never existed. Almost all objective indicators of the
quality of urban life have improved markedly with their rapid decentralization over
the last half century. Certainly there are enormous problems to be faced, but there
is little indication that trying to force the city back into the mold of the nineteenth
century industrial city will help.
In the realm of transportation, for example, the focus on sprawl, which has tended
to pit private versus public transportation and transit versus the automobile, seems
to have been counter-productive. Since the 1960s the drum roll of criticism of ur-
ban highways appears to have played a signiﬁcant role in reducing the public’s will-
ingness to pay for more roads, but the poor performance of new transit systems has
not brought any corresponding upsurge in willingness to pay for these either. Instead
there have been attempts to shift funding priorities within existing transportation dol-
lars and these shifts have usually been counter-productive from the standpoint of the
transportation system as a whole. For example shifting funding from roads, which are
used by the vast majority of Americans, into transit, which is used by a tiny minority,
has done little to reverse the decline in modal share of transit, but it has led to decreased
spending on roads and has been partially responsible for major increases in congestion.
e focus of many transit advocates for rail over bus, meanwhile, has resulted in many
cities in a transfer of funding from heavily used existing bus lines to lightly used new
rail lines, resulting in a declining transportation capacity overall.
e ﬁght against sprawl and the resulting battle between advocates for roads and
for transit has also made it much more diﬃcult to move forward with new technologies
and transportation modes. Never have the possibilities been brighter for new forms of
transport that break out of the old categories of private versus public and automobile vs
transit and that promise to provide some real gains in accessibility while simultaneously
reducing unfortunate environmental by-products.
Unfortunately the attacks on highways and sprawl have helped to destroy the con-
sensus about infrastructure investment for the future that characterized much of the
past century. From the streetcars and rapid transit lines of the late nineteenth century
to the superhighways and airports of the mid-twentieth there was enormous conﬁdence
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that with the building of infrastructure we could overcome many of the apparently in-
tractable transportation problems of the past, and indeed that is what happened as
the new forms of transportation enlarged enormously the range of choices available
to the average American family. Particularly since the 1960s, however, there has been
a change of mood which corresponds pretty closely with the growth of anti-sprawl
sentiment.
A great deal of what is written about transportation today suggests either that there
is no solution to urban transportation problems or that we need to push cities back into
the forms they had at some previous date in history. Anti-sprawl activists were very
successful with concepts like “induced demand” and slogans like “We can’t build our
way out of congestion” despite the obvious fact that most of the automobiles seen on
newly opened highways were there because of latent demand, not newly induced de-
mand, and many urban areas have indeed gone a long way toward building themselves
out of congestion whereas those areas that have lagged behind in road building have
seen congestion rise very dramatically.
It is quite likely that within the next few decades technology will shape a funda-
mentally new transportation picture. Using new fuel sources, smaller, more ﬂexible ve-
hicles on guideways or in the air, and intelligent transportation systems that can operate
faster, more safely and at much higher capacity than today’s systems, the implications
for the city are profound. Of course we can only guess what the new transportation
systems will look like. In the meantime trying to remake our very long-lived urban
built environment so that it will force more people to ride in old fashioned buses and
trains is a classic case of the tail wagging the dog. It is a short-term ﬁx that will not only
not solve current problems but could easily inhibit much better means of transport in
the future.
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